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Abstract
Though Deep Neural Networks (DNN) show excellent
performance across various computer vision tasks, several
works show their vulnerability to adversarial samples, i.e.,
image samples with imperceptible noise engineered to ma-
nipulate the network’s prediction. Adversarial sample gen-
eration methods range from simple to complex optimiza-
tion techniques. Majority of these methods generate adver-
saries through optimization objectives that are tied to the
pre-softmax or softmax output of the network. In this work
we, (i) show the drawbacks of such attacks, (ii) propose two
new evaluation metrics: Old Label New Rank (OLNR) and
New Label Old Rank (NLOR) in order to quantify the extent
of damage made by an attack, and (iii) propose a new ad-
versarial attack FDA: Feature Disruptive Attack, to address
the drawbacks of existing attacks. FDA works by generat-
ing image perturbation that disrupt features at each layer of
the network and causes deep-features to be highly corrupt.
This allows FDA adversaries to severely reduce the perfor-
mance of deep networks. We experimentally validate that
FDA generates stronger adversaries than other state-of-the-
art methods for image classification, even in the presence of
various defense measures. More importantly, we show that
FDA disrupts feature-representation based tasks even with-
out access to the task-specific network or methodology.1
1. Introduction
With the advent of deep-learning based algorithms, re-
markable progress has been achieved in various com-
puter vision applications. However, a plethora of existing
works [9, 49, 8, 39], have clearly established that Deep Neu-
ral Networks (DNNs) are susceptible to adversarial sam-
ples: input data containing imperceptible noise specifically
crafted to manipulate the network’s prediction. Further,
Szegedy et al. [49] showed that adversarial samples trans-
∗Work done as a member of Video Analytics Lab, IISc, India.
1Code available at https://github.com/BardOfCodes/fda
(a) Original image (b) FDA-sample’s inversion
(d) PGD-sample’s inversion(c) Clean sample’s inversion
Figure 1. Using feature inversion [34], we visualize the Mixed7b
representation of Inception-V3 [48]. The inversion of PGD-
attacked sample (d) is remarkably similar to inversion of clean
sample (c). In contrast, inversion of FDA-attacked sample (b)
completely obfuscates the clean sample’s information.
fer across models i.e., adversarial samples generated for one
model can adversely affect other unrelated models as well.
This transferable nature of adversarial samples further in-
creases the vulnerability of DNNs deployed in real world.
As DNNs become more-and-more ubiquitous, especially in
decision-critical applications, such as Autonomous Driv-
ing [2], the necessity of investigating adversarial samples
has become paramount.
Majority of existing attacks [49, 13, 33, 16], generate ad-
versarial samples via optimizing objectives that are tied to
the pre-softmax or softmax output of the network. The sole
objective of these attacks is to generate adversarial samples
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which are misclassified by the network with very high con-
fidence. While the classification output is changed, it is un-
clear what happens to the internal deep representations of
the network. Hence, we ask a fundamental question:
Do deep features of adversarial samples retain usable
clean sample information?
In this work, we demonstrate that deep features of adver-
sarial samples generated using such attacks retain high-level
semantic information of the corresponding clean samples.
This is due to the fact that these attacks optimize only pre-
softmax or softmax score based objective to generate ad-
versarial samples. We provide evidence for this observation
by leveraging feature inversion [35], where, given a feature
representation ψ(x), we optimize to construct the approxi-
mate inverse ψ−1(ψ(x)). Using the ability to visualize deep
features, we highlight the retention of clean information in
deep features of adversarial samples. The fact that deep fea-
tures of adversarial samples retain clean sample information
has important implications:
• First, such deep features may still be useful for vari-
ous feature driven tasks such as caption generation [52,
58], and style-transfer [21, 25, 51].
• Secondly, these adversarial samples cause the model
to either predict semantically similar class or to retain
high (comparatively) probability for the original label,
while predicting a very different class. These observa-
tions are captured by using the proposed metrics i.e.,
New Label’s Old Rank (NLOR) and Old Label’s New
Rank (OLNR), and statistics such as fooling rate at kth
rank.
These implications are major drawbacks of existing attacks
which optimize only pre-softmax or softmax score based
objectives. Based on these observations, in this work, we
seek adversarial samples that can corrupt deep features and
inflict severe damage to feature representations. With this
motivation, we introduce FDA: Feature Disruptive attack.
FDA generates perturbation with the aim to cause disrup-
tion of features at each layer of the network in a principled
manner. This results in corruption of deep features, which
in turn degrades the performance of the network. Figure 1
shows feature inversion from deep features of a clean, a
PGD [33] attacked, and a FDA attacked sample, highlight-
ing the lack of clean sample information after our proposed
attack.
Following are the benefits of our proposed attack: (i)
FDA invariably flips the predicted label to highly unrelated
classes, while also successfully removing evidence of the
clean sample’s predicted label. As we elaborate in sec-
tion 5, other attacks [49, 30, 13] only achieve one of the
above objectives. (ii) Unlike existing attacks, FDA disrupts
feature-representation based tasks e.g., caption generation,
even without access to the task-specific network or method-
ology i.e., it is effective in a gray-box attack setting. (iii)
FDA generates stronger adversaries than other state-of-the-
art methods for Image classification. Even in the presence
of various recently proposed defense measures (including
adversarial training), our proposed attack consistently out-
performs other existing attacks.
In summary, the major contributions of this work are:
• We demonstrate the drawbacks of existing attacks.
• We propose two new evaluation metrics i.e., NLOR
and OLNR, in order to quantify the extent of damage
made by an attack method.
• We introduce a new attack called FDA motivated by
corrupting features at every layer. We experimentally
validate that FDA creates stronger white-box adver-
saries than other attacks on ImageNet dataset for state-
of-the-art classifiers, even in the presence of various
defense mechanisms.
• Finally, we successfully attack two feature based-
tasks, namely caption generation and style transfer
where current attack methods either fail or are exhibit
weaker attack than FDA. A novel “Gray-Box” attack
scenario is also presented where FDA again exhibits
stronger attacking capability.
2. Related Works
Attacks: Following the demonstration by Szegedy et
al. [49] on the existence of adversarial samples, multiple
works [22, 38, 29, 16, 4, 33, 13, 10] have proposed various
techniques for generating adversarial samples. Parallelly,
works such as [36, 57, 6] have explored the existence of
adversarial samples for other tasks.
The works closest to our approach are Zhou et al. [59],
Sabour et al. [43] and Mopuri et al. [41]. Zhou et al. create
black-box transferable adversaries by simultaneously opti-
mizing multiple objectives, including a final-layer cross en-
tropy term. In contrast, we only optimize for our formula-
tion of feature disruption (refer section 4.3). Sabour et al.
specifically optimize to make a specific layer’s feature ar-
bitrarily close to a target image’s features. Our objective
is significantly different entailing disruption at every layer
of a DNNs, without relying on a ’target’ image representa-
tion. Finally, Mopuri et al. provide a complex optimization
setup for crafting UAPs whereas our method yields image-
specific adversaries. We show that a simple adaptation of
their method to craft image-specific adversaries yields poor
results (refer supplementary material).
Defenses: Goodfellow et al. [22] first showed that including
adversarial samples in the training regime increases robust-
ness of DNNs to adversarial attacks. Following this work,
multiple approaches [30, 50, 27, 54, 17, 33] have been pro-
posed for adversarial training, addressing important con-
cerns such as Gradient masking, and label leaking.
Recent works [40, 31, 1, 46, 15, 11], present many al-
ternative to adversarial training. Crucially, works such as
[23, 56, 53] propose defense techniques which can be eas-
ily implemented for large scale datasets such as ImageNet.
While Guo et al. [23] propose utilizing input transformation
as a defense technique, Xie et al. [56] introduce randomized
transformations in the input as a defense.
Feature Visualization: Feature inversion has a long history
in machine learning [55]. Mahendran et al. [34] proposed
an optimization method for feature inversion, combining
feature reconstruction with regularization objectives. Con-
trarily, Dosovitskiy et al. [18] introduce a neural network
for imposing image priors on the reconstruction. Recent
works such as [45, 20] have followed the suit. The reader is
referred to [19] for a comprehensive survey.
Feature-based Tasks: DNNs have become the preferred
feature extractors over hand-engineered local descriptors
like SIFT or HOG [5, 7]. Hence, various tasks such as cap-
tioning [52, 58], and image-retrieval [12, 24] rely on DNNs
for extracting image information. Recently, tasks such as
style-transfer have been introduced which rely on deep fea-
tures as well. While works such as [25, 51] propose a learn-
ing based approach, Gatys et al. [21] perform an optimiza-
tion on selected deep features.
We show that previous attacks create adversarial sam-
ples which still provide useful information for feature-
based tasks. In contrast, FDA inflicts severe damage to
feature-based tasks without any task-specific information or
methodology.
3. Preliminaries
We define a classifier f : x ∈ Rm → y ∈ Y c, where
x is the m dimensional input, and y is the c dimensional
score vector containing pre-softmax scores for the c differ-
ent classes. Applying softmax on the output y gives us the
predicted probabilities for the c classes, and argmax(y) is
taken as the predicted label for input x. Let yGT represent
the ground truth label of sample x. Now, an adversarial
sample x˜ can be defined as any input sample such that:
argmax(f(x˜)) 6= yGT & d(x, x˜) < , (1)
where d(x, x˜) <  acts as an imperceptibility constraint,
and is typically considered as a l2 or l∞ constraint.
Attacks such as [49, 22, 16, 33], find adversarial sam-
ples by different optimization methods, but with the same
optimization objective: maximizing the cross-entropy loss
J(f(x˜), yGT ) for the adversarial sample x˜. Fast Gradient
Sign Method (FGSM) [49] performs a single step optimiza-
tion, yielding an adversary :
FGSM(x) = x˜ = x+  · sign(∇x(J(f(x), yGT ))) (2)
On the other hand, PGD [33] and I-FGSM [22] performs
a multi-step signed-gradient ascent on this objective. Works
such as [16, 4], further integrate Momentum and ADAM
optimizer for maximizing the objective.
Kurakin et al. [30] discovered the phenomena of label
leaking and use predicted label instead of yGT . This yields
a class of attacks which can be called most-likely attacks,
where the loss objective is changed to J(f(x˜), yML) (where
yML represents the class with the maximum predicted prob-
ability).
Works such as [27, 50] note that above methods yield
adversarial samples which are weak, in the sense of being
misclassified into a very similar class (for e.g., a hound mis-
classified as a terrier). They posit that targeted attacks are
more meaningful, and utilize least likely attacks, proposing
minimization of Loss objective J(f(x˜), yLL) (where yLL
represents the class with the least predicted probability). We
denote the most-likely and the least-likely variant of any at-
tack by the suffix ML and LL.
Carlini et al. [13] propose multiple different objec-
tives and optimization methods for generating adversaries.
Among the proposed objectives, they infer that the strongest
objective is as follows:
Objective(x˜) = (maxi 6=ML(f(x˜)i)− f(x˜)ML)+, (3)
where (e)+ is short-hand for max(e, 0). For a l∞ distance
metric adversary, this objective can be integrated with PGD
optimization to yield PGD-CW. The notation introduced in
this section is followed throughout the paper.
Feature inversion: Feature inversion can be summarized as
the problem of finding the sample whose representation is
the closest match to a given representation [55]. We use the
approach proposed by Mahendran et al. [34]. Additionally,
to improve the inversion, we use Laplacian pyramid gradi-
ent normalization. We provide additional information in the
supplementary.
4. Feature Disruptive Attack
4.1. Drawbacks of existing attacks
In this section, we provide qualitative evidence to show
that deep features corresponding to adversarial samples
generated by existing attacks (i.e., attacks that optimize ob-
jectives tied to the softmax or pre-softmax layer of the net-
work), retain high level semantic information of its corre-
sponding clean sample. We use feature inversion to provide
evidence for this observation.
Figure 2 shows the feature inversion for different layers
of VGG-16 [44] architecture trained on ImageNet dataset,
(b) PGD-Adversarial Sample’s Feature Inversion
(a) Clean sample’s Feature-inversion
(c) FDA-Adversarial Sample’s Feature Inversion
Conv 5-1 Conv 5-2 Conv 5-3 Pool 5
(b) PGD-LL adversarial sample’s Feature-inversion
(c) FDA adversarial sample’s Feature-inversion
Figure 2. Feature Inversion: Layer-by-layer Feature Inversion [34]
of clean, PGD-LL-adversa i l and FDA-adversarial sample. Note
the significant removal of clean sample information in later layers
of FDA-adversarial sample.
for the clean and its corresponding adversarial sample.
From Fig. 2, it can be observed that the inversion of ad-
versarial features of PGD-LL sample [33] is remarkably
similar to the inversion of features of clean sample. Fur-
ther, in section 5.1, we statistically show the similarity be-
tween intermediate feature representations of clean and its
corresponding adversarial samples generated using differ-
ent existing attack methods. Finally, in section 5.2 we
show that as a consequence of retaining clean sample infor-
mation, these adversarial samples cause the model to either
predict semantically similar class or to retain high (compar-
atively) probability for the original label, while predicting a
very different class. These observations are captured by us-
ing the proposed metrics i.e., New Label Old Rank (NLOR)
and Old Label New Rank (OLNR), and statistics such as
fooling rate at k-th rank.
4.2. Proposed evaluation metrics
An attack’s strength is typically measured in terms of
fooling rate [37], which measures the percentage (%) of
images for which the predicted label was changed due to
the attack. However, only looking at fooling rate does not
present the full picture of the attack. On one hand, attacks
such as PGD-ML may result in flipping of label into a se-
mantically similar class, and on the other hand, attacks such
as PGD-LL may flip the label to a very different class, while
still retaining high (comparatively) probability for the orig-
inal label. These drawbacks are not captured in the existing
evaluation metric i.e., Fooling rate.
Hence, we propose two new evaluation metrics, New La-
bel Old Rank (NLOR) and Old Label New Rank (OLNR).
For a given input image, the softmax output of a C-
way classifier represents the confidence for each of the C
classes. We sort these class confidences in descending or-
der (from rank 1 to C). Consider the prediction of the net-
work before the attack as the old label and after the attack
as the new label. Post attack, the rank of the old label will
change from 1 to say ‘p’. This new rank ‘p’ of the old label
is defined as OLNR (Old Label’s New Rank). Further, post
attack, the rank of the new label would have changed from
say ‘q’ to 1. This old rank ‘q’ of the new label is defined as
NLOR (New Label’s Old Rank). Hence, a stronger attack
should flip to a label which had a high old rank (which will
yield high NLOR), and also reduce probability for the clean
prediction (which will yield a high OLNR). These metrics
are computed for all the mis-classified images and the mean
value is reported.
4.3. Proposed attack
We now present Feature Disruptive Attack (FDA), our
proposed attack formulation explicitly designed to generate
perturbation that contaminate and corrupt the internal rep-
resentations of a DNN. The aim of the proposed attack is
to generate image specific perturbation which, when added
to the image should not only flip the label but also disrupt
its inner feature representations at each layer of the DNN.
We first note that activations supporting the current predic-
tion have to be lowered, whereas activations which do not
support the current prediction have to be strengthened and
increased. This can lead to feature representations which,
while hiding the true information, contains high activations
for features not present in the image. Hence, for a given ith
layer li, our layer objective L, which we want to increase is
given by:
L(li) = D
({li(x˜)Nj |Nj 6∈ Si})
−D ({li(x˜)Nj |Nj ∈ Si}) , (4)
where li(x˜)Nj represents the Nj th value of li(x˜), Si repre-
sents the set of activations which support the current pre-
diction, and D is a monotonically increasing function of
activations l(x˜)Nj (on the partially ordered set R
|Si|). We
define D as the l2-norm of inputs li(x˜).
Finding the set Si is non-trivial. While all high activa-
tions may not support the current prediction, in practice, we
find it to be usable approximation. We define the support
set Si as:
Si = {Nj | li(x)Nj > C}, (5)
where C is a measure of central tendency. We try various
choices of C includingmedian(li(x)) and inter-quartile-
mean(li(x)). Overall, we find spatial-mean(li(x)) =
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Figure 3. Overview Image: From network (a), for each selected
feature blob (b) we perform the optimization (d) as explained in
equation 6. (c) shows a spatial feature, where the support set Si is
colored red, and the remaining is blue.
C(h,w) (mean across channels) to be the most effective
formulation. Finally, combining Eq. (4) and (5), our layer
objective L becomes:
L(li) = log
(
D
({li(x˜)(h,w,c)|li(x)(h,w,c) < Ci(h,w)}) )
− log (D ({li(x˜)(h,w,c)|li(x)(h,w,c) > Ci(h,w)}) ),
(6)
We perform this optimization at each non-linearity in the
network, and combine the per-layer objectives as follows:
Objective = −
K∑
i=1
L(li),
such that ‖x˜− x‖∞ < ,
(7)
Figure 3 provides a visual overview of the proposed
method. In supplementary document we provide results for
ablation study of the proposed attack i.e., different formula-
tion of C such as median, Inter-Quartile-mean etc.
5. Experiments
In this section, we first present statistical analysis of the
features corresponding to adversarial samples generated us-
ing existing attacks and the proposed attack. Further, we
show the effectiveness of the proposed attack on (i) im-
age recognition in white-box (Sec. 5.2) and black-box
settings (shown in supplementary document), (ii) Feature-
representation based tasks (Sec. 5.4) i.e., caption genera-
tion and style-transfer. We define optimization budget of
an attack by the tuple (, nbiter, iter), where  is the L∞
norm limit on the perturbation added to the image, nbiter
defines the number of optimization iterations used by the
attack method, and iter is the increment in the L∞ norm
limit of the perturbation at each iteration.
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Figure 4. Cosine distance between features of clean image and
its corresponding adversarial sample, at different layer of P-
NasNet [32] architecture.
5.1. Statistical analysis of adversarial features
In this section, we present the analysis which fundamen-
tally motivates our attack formulation. We present various
experiments, which posit that attack formulations tied to
pre-softmax based objectives retain clean sample informa-
tion in deep features, whereas FDA is effective at removing
them. For all the following experiments, all attacks have
been given the same optimization budget ( = 8, nbiter =
10, iter = 1). Reported numbers have been averaged over
1000 image samples.
First, we measure the similarity between intermediate
feature representations of the clean and its corresponding
adversarial samples generated using different attack meth-
ods. Figure 4, shows average cosine distance between in-
termediate feature representations of the clean and its cor-
responding adversarial samples, for various attack methods
on PNasNet [32] architecture. From Fig. 4 it can be ob-
served that for the proposed attack, feature dis-similarity is
much higher than to that of the other attacks. The signif-
icant difference in cosine distance implies that contamina-
tion of intermediate feature is much higher for the proposed
attack. We observe similar trend in other models at different
optimization budgets (, nbiter, iter) as well (refer supple-
mentary).
Now, we measure the similarity between features of
clean and adversarial samples at the pre-logits layer (i.e.,
input to the classification layer) of the network. Apart from
cosine distance, we also measure the Normalized Rank
Transformation (NRT) distance. NRT-distance represents
the average shift in the rank of the kth ordered statistic ∀ k.
Primary benefit of NRT-distance measure is its robustness
to outliers.
Table 1, tabulates the result for pre-logit output for mul-
tiple architectures. It can be observed that our proposed
attack shows superiority to other methods. Although the
pre-logits representations from other attacks seem to be cor-
Table 1. Metrics for measuring the dissimilarity between adver-
sarial pre-logits and clean pre-logits on different networks. Our
method FDA exhibits stronger dissimilarity.
PGD-ML PGD-CW PGD-LL Ours
Res-152 Cosine Dist. 0.49 0.37 0.60 0.81
NRT Dist. 15.00 13.56 16.29 19.17
Inc-V3 Cosine Dist. 0.51 0.41 0.49 0.55
NRT Dist. 16.11 14.97 17.38 19.01
rupted, in section 5 we show that these pre-logits represen-
tation provide useful information for feature-based tasks.
5.2. Attack on Image Recognition
ImageNet [42] is one of the most frequently used large-
scale dataset for evaluating adversarial attacks. We evaluate
our proposed attack on five DNN architectures trained on
ImageNet dataset, including state-of-the-art PNASNet [32]
architecture. We compare FDA to the strongest white-box
optimization method (PGD), with different optimization ob-
jective, resulting in the following set of competing attacks:
PGD-ML, PGD-LL, and PGD-CW.
We present our evaluation on the ImageNet-compatible
dataset introduced in NIPS 2017 challenge (contains 5, 000
images). To provide a comprehensive analysis of our pro-
posed attack, we present results with different optimization
budgets. Note that attacks are compared only when they
have the same optimization budget.
Table 2: top section presents the evaluation of multiple
attack formulations across different DNN architectures with
the optimization budget ( = 4, nbiter = 5, iter = 1) in
white-box setting. A crucial inference is the partial success
of other attacks in terms of NLOR and OLNR. They either
achieve significant NLOR or OLNR. This is due to the sin-
gular objective of either lowering the maximal probability,
or increasing probability of the least-likely class. Table 2
also highlights the significant drop in performance of other
attack for deeper networks (PNASNet [32] and Inception-
ResNet [47]) due to vanishing gradients.
In Figure 5, we present Generalizable Fooling Rate [41]
with respect to Top-k accuracy as a function of k. The sig-
nificantly higher Generalizable Fooling Rate at high k val-
ues further establishes the superiority of our proposed attack
on networks trained on ImageNet dataset.
5.3. Evaluation against Defense proposals
Now, we present evaluation against defenses mecha-
nisms which have been scaled to ImageNet (experiments
on defense mechanisms in smaller dataset (CIFAR-10) [28]
are provided in the supplementary document).
Adversarial Training: We test our proposed attack
against three adversarial training regimes, namely: Sim-
ple (adv) [30], Ensemble (ens3) [50] and Adversarial-logit-
pairing (alp) [27] based adversarial training. We set the op-
timization budget of ( = 8, nbiter = 5, iter = 2) for all
the attacks on adv and ens3 models. Table 2: bottom sec-
tion presents the results of our evaluation. Further, to show
effectiveness at different optimization budgets, alp models
are tested with different optimization budget, as show in Ta-
ble 3.
Defense Mechanisms: We also test our model against de-
fense mechanisms proposed by Guo et al. [23] and Xie et
al. [56]. Table 4 shows fooling rate achieved in Inception-
ResNet V2 [47], under the presence of various defense
mechanisms. The above results confirm the superiority of
our proposed attack for white-box attack.
5.4. Attacking Feature-Representation based tasks
5.4.1 Caption Generation
Most DNNs involved in real-world applications utilize
transfer learning to alleviate problems such as data scarcity
and efficiency. Furthermore, due to the easy accessibility of
trained models on ImageNet dataset, such models have be-
come the preferred starting point for training task-specific
models. This presents an interesting scenario, where the
attacker may have the knowledge of which model was fine-
tuned for the given task, but may not have access to the
fine-tuned model.
Due to the partial availability of information, such a sce-
nario in essence acts as a “Gray-Box” setup. We hypoth-
esize that in such a scenario, feature-corruption based at-
tacks should be more effective than softmax or pre-softmax
based attacks. To test this hypothesis, we attack the caption-
generator “Show-and-Tell” (SAT) [52], which utilizes a Im-
ageNet trained Inception-V3 (IncV3) model as the starting
point, using adversaries generated from only the ImageNet-
trained IncV3 network. Note that the IncV3 in SAT has
been fine-tuned for 2 Million steps (albeit with a smaller
learning rate).
Table 5 presents the effect of adversarial attacks on cap-
tion generation. We attack “Show-and-Tell” [52]. Simi-
lar performance can be expected on advanced models such
as [26, 58]. We clearly see the effectiveness of FDA in such
a “Gray-Box” scenario, validating the presented hypothe-
sis. Additionally, we note the content-specific metrics such
as SPICE [3], are far more degraded. This is due to the fact
that other attacks may change the features only to support
a similar yet different object class, whereas FDA aims to
completely removes the evidence of the clean sample.
We further show results for attacking SAT in a “White-
box” setup in Table 6. We compare against Hongge et
al. [14] as well, an attack specifically formulated for cap-
tion generation. While the prime benefit of Hongge et al.
is the ability to perform targeted attack, we observe that we
are comparable to Hongge et al. in the untargeted scenario.
Table 2. Evaluation of various attacks on networks trained on ImageNet dataset, in white-box setting. Top: Comparison on normally trained
architectures, with the optimization budget (refer section 5) of ( = 4, nbiter = 5, iter = 1). Bottom: Comparison on adversarially trained
models (adv & ens), with the budget ( = 8, nbiter = 5, iter = 2). The salient feature of our attack is high performance on all metrics
at the same time.
Metrics Fooling Rate NLOR OLNR
PGD-ML PGD-CW PGD-LL Ours PGD-ML PGD-CW PGD-LL Ours PGD-ML PGD-CW PGD-LL Ours
VGG-16 99.90 99.90 93.80 97.80 57.26 6.17 539.92 433.33 308.34 29.19 217.98 455.26
ResNet-152 99.50 99.60 88.15 97.69 20.62 5.12 593.64 412.52 247.22 21.84 89.58 380.04
Inc-V3 99.20 99.10 89.06 99.80 61.73 21.95 599.49 549.57 524.65 63.86 92.45 669.31
IncRes-V2 94.18 94.58 74.30 99.60 75.43 44.51 314.20 492.95 314.14 44.46 67.02 487.76
PNasNet-Large 92.60 92.40 81.40 99.00 123.93 59.44 319.18 473.54 335.63 70.67 118.73 512.21
Inc-V3adv 97.89 97.69 80.62 99.70 68.03 34.56 346.59 545.89 281.75 39.08 77.80 629.93
Inc-V3ens3 98.69 97.49 88.76 100.00 114.96 68.76 450.66 533.49 386.16 106.58 142.65 634.55
IncRes-V2adv 91.27 89.66 61.65 99.70 81.80 39.68 284.36 504.51 234.66 33.20 67.27 571.46
IncRes-V2ens3 98.69 97.49 88.76 100.00 114.96 68.76 450.66 533.49 386.16 106.58 142.65 634.55
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Figure 5. Fooling rate at K-th rank for various attacks in white-box setting with the optimization budget (refer section 5) ( = 8, nbiter =
10, iter = 1). Attacks are performed on networks trained on ImageNet dataset. Column-1: VGG-16, Column-2: ResNet-152, Column-3:
Inception-V3 and Column-4: PNASNet-Large.
5.4.2 Style-transfer
From its introduction in [21], Style-transfer has been a
highly popular application of DNNs, specially in arts. How-
ever, to the best of our knowledge, adversarial attacks on
Style-transfer have not yet been studied.
Earlier method by Gatys et al. [21] proposed an op-
Table 3. Evaluation on ALP [27]-adversarially trained model,
with different optimization budget.
 = 8, nbiter = 5, iter = 2
PGD-ML PGD-CW PGD-LL Ours
Fooling Rate 85.04 87.15 51.10 80.02
NLOR 22.28 10.83 20.60 119.41
OLNR 77.55 11.14 14.90 81.73
 = 16, nbiter = 10, iter = 2
PGD-ML PGD-CW PGD-LL Ours
Fooling Rate 96.99 98.29 64.56 94.28
NLOR 41.51 12.26 77.40 259.78
OLNR 302.03 14.97 25.66 241.43
timization based approach, which utilizes gradients from
trained networks to create an image which retains “con-
tent” from one image, and “style” from another. We first
show that adversaries generated from other methods (PGD
etc.) completely retain the structural content of the clean
Table 4. Evaluation of various attacks in the presence of in-
put transformation based defense measures with budget ( =
16, nbiter = 10, iter = 2). While achieving higher fooling rate,
we also achieve higher NLOR and OLNR (refer supplementary).
Defenses Fooling Rate
PGD-ML PGD-CW PGD-LL Ours
Gaussian Filter 81.93 36.95 68.57 92.87
Median Filter 50.40 23.19 38.45 70.88
Bilateral Filter 54.52 19.18 41.47 70.18
Bit Quant. 73.90 40.86 62.05 91.77
JPEG Comp. 79.82 31.83 66.67 96.18
TV Min. 38.96 17.67 27.81 55.72
Quilting 38.35 24.10 30.82 56.63
Randomize [56] 81.93 42.87 68.17 98.19
Figure 6. Attacking Style Transfer. Top: PGD adversaries provide clean sample information sufficient for effective style transfer, whereas
FDA adversaries do not. (d): Generating adversaries for Johnson et al. [25] using FDA, where PGD formulation fails. Leftmost image
presents the style, followed by a sequence of clean image, style-transfer before and after adversarial attack by FDA.
sample, allowing them to be used for style transfer with-
out any loss in quality. In contrast, as FDA adversaries cor-
rupts the clean information. Hence, apart from causing mis-
classification, FDA adversaries also severely damage style-
transfer. Figure 6: top shows example of style-transfer on
clean, PGD-adversarial, and FDA adversarial sample. More
importantly, FDA disrupts style-transfer without utilizing
any task-specific knowledge or methodology.
Table 5. Attacking “Show-and-Tell”(SAT) [52] in a “Gray-box”
setup with budget ( = 8, nbiter = 10, iter = 1). The right-
most column tabulates the metrics when complete white noise is
given as input. FDA Adversaries generated from Inception-V3 are
highly effective for disrupting SAT.
Metrics No Attack PGD-ML PGD-LL MI-FGSM Ours Noise
CIDEr 103.21 47.95 47.13 49.23 4.90 2.84
Blue-1 71.61 57.04 55.68 57.18 39.80 37.60
RoughL 53.61 42.15 41.24 42.65 30.70 29.30
METEOR 25.58 17.507 16.78 17.34 10.02 7.84
SPICE 18.07 9.60 9.45 10.02 2.04 1.00
Table 6. Attacking (SAT) [52] in a “White-box” setup with budget
( = 8, nbiter = 10, iter = 1). FDA is at-par with task-specific
attack [14]
Metrics No Attack PGD-ML MI-FGSM [14] Ours Noise
CIDEr 94.90 31.70 31.21 10.80 4.14 2.84
Blue-1 69.13 51.64 51.36 38.95 39.80 37.60
RoughL 51.68 38.20 38.20 28.19 31.00 29.30
METEOR 24.29 14.55 14.60 9.75 9.30 7.84
SPICE 17.08 7.30 7.00 3.38 1.68 0.99
In [25], Johnson et al. introduced a novel approach
where a network is trained to perform style-transfer in a sin-
gle forward pass. In such a setup it is infeasible to mount an
attack with PGD-like adversaries as there is no final layer
to derive loss-gradients from. In contrast, with the white-
box access to the parameters of these networks, FDA adver-
saries can be generated to disrupt style-transfer, without any
change in its formulation. Figure 6: bottom shows qualita-
tive examples of disruption caused due to FDA adversaries
in the model proposed by Johnson et al. Style-transfer has
been applied to videos as well. We have provided qualita-
tive results in the supplementary to show that FDA remains
highly effective in disrupting stylized videos as well.
6. Conclusion
In this work, we establish the retention of clean sam-
ple information in adversarial samples generated by attacks
that optimizes objective tied to softmax or pre-softmax layer
of the network. This is found to be true even when these
samples are misclassified with high confidence. Further,
we highlight the weakness of such attacks using the pro-
posed evaluation metrics: OLNR and NLOR. We then pro-
pose FDA, an adversarial attack which corrupts the features
at each layer of the network. We experimentally validate
that FDA generates one of the strongest white-box adver-
saries. Additionally, we show that feature of FDA adver-
sarial samples do not allow extraction of useful information
for feature-based tasks such as style-transfer, and caption-
generation as well.
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